# Obama's indecision causing military troop losses



## Hunter_58346 (May 22, 2003)

By Justin Quinn, About.com

In his quest to leave a legacy of health care reform, Obama has, at best, neglected the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and, at worst, just simply ignored them. His delay in responding to the troop request and his failure to implement the military strategy of his own commanders is directly responsible for the deaths of those eight troops who died this weekend furthering the cause of freedom. For it appears he has already forgotten about them. Rather than acknowledging their death this morning, the president forged obliviously ahead with his agenda, using the Rose Garden to hold a reception for doctors who support a public health insurance option.

When it comes to the war Afghanistan, the president's chief concern appears to be appeasing a fickle public whose support rises and falls with every tactical success or failure. As a result of his confounded indecision, the death of more American troops isn't just likely -- it's a certainty.


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## TK33 (Aug 12, 2008)

remind me again who was the president when we invaded afghanistan? Who was the president/party in power when we didn't finish afghanistan and started another war? Who was in power when we invaded afghanistan and left the pakistani border wide open???????

Maybe the ones in power were having a brunch with Halliburton and BP at the time


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## southdakbearfan (Oct 11, 2004)

We all know who started it, and you can argue got distracted with iraq.

But I know Bush spent more than 25 minutes with his general(s), instead of spending numerous hours with different media personalities, while not making a decision on the path/strategy of the war at hand.

Didn't we even have to have senate hearings on the strategy and vote on sending more troups? At this rate we will be doing hearings and voting in about 2010, after the midterm elections.

You could even argue Cheney and Rumsfield were in charge of the war and Bush was along for the ride, but at least someone was.

They at least listened to the generals finally in iraq and sent enough men to make a difference.

Right now, we are sitting on our thumbs, waiting for any decision.


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## TK33 (Aug 12, 2008)

I would like to have seen rumsfeld stay, along with powell. Rumsfeld's press conferences were at the very least entertaining. Rumsfeld's military vision of a smaller and more precision military are being carried on by Gates.

The point is that it is time to rethink some of our global policies and strategies. Is the answer more troops? Is the answer more allied troops? Is the answer something else?

This president has not dropped the ball as badly as the last, at least not yet. And as far as the back scratching and paybacks go that is like the kettle calling the pot black.


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## Hunter_58346 (May 22, 2003)

Hasn't dropped the ball? He can't even find the ball to drop it! He has spent more time in the makeup room preparing for his interviews with MSNBC than with his military experts. Blaming past administrations for his ineptitude is in true democratic response.
Either send help or get them the hell out, period. Whichever he does, get it done now and live with it instead of playing with the lives of our troops on the ground.


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## Old Hunter (Mar 8, 2002)

Afghanistan was supposed to be a United Nations operation.Most all of the members are cowards and have backed out of their commitments. It is not reasonable to blame our past or present president for that situation.
Tough situation, millions of primative people following a evil religion.
If we pull out of the mideast I believe Afghanistan,Pakistan,and Iraq will quickly fall into the hands of terriosts. You will then have nuclear weapons in the hands of people that are insane.They will blackmail the world.


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## Bowstring (Nov 27, 2006)

Old Hunter said:


> Afghanistan was supposed to be a United Nations operation.


So was Iraq after the IAEA told us that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. The USA just gets to take all the blame, mostly from its own citizens!! uke:


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## southdakbearfan (Oct 11, 2004)

I certainly remember when "EVERYTHING" under the sun was Bush's fault.

And granted I didn't like Bush all that much, but now we can't blaim anybody for anything.


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## TK33 (Aug 12, 2008)

Hunter_58346 said:


> Hasn't dropped the ball? He can't even find the ball to drop it! He has spent more time in the makeup room preparing for his interviews with MSNBC than with his military experts. Blaming past administrations for his ineptitude is in true democratic response.
> Either send help or get them the hell out, period. Whichever he does, get it done now and live with it instead of playing with the lives of our troops on the ground.


I believe that what is going on now is probably going to better in the long run. For once there may actually be some thought put into not only troop numbers but also long term strategy to end this war and getting back on track. Old Hunter is right on the money, this isn't going to end soon. We need a new course and new agreements with allies and a commitment from the country, I agree that this time just adding troops may not be the only answer.

As stated earlier, this is not only our problem but the problem of the entire civilized world. It is time that the europeans start holding up their end of the bargain, both in resources and in cash. We spent way too much money, and have lost too many soldiers fighting these wars on our own.

We should have learned these lessons from Vietnam.


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## Hunter_58346 (May 22, 2003)

So how much longer should we "think" about it? It has been over two months now. We are getting our butts kicked and losing more troops because of the thought process. Today on NBC news, they stated that Obama's decision will come AFTER the election over there.  Unbelievable!!!


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## TK33 (Aug 12, 2008)

It would seem prudent to know who is in power before making a decision. As far as the butt kicking goes, that is what the media reports, we all know how that goes.


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## Plainsman (Jul 30, 2003)

The problem is by the time elections are held we could be set back years and loose a few hundred soldiers. I think we need to send more now, hold the line, then after elections see where we go. We can continue to pressure Europe while we make sure we have enough forces to ensure the safety of those who are there now. Or at least improve their safety.

Maybe we spent to much money on the Kennedy memorial. It was attached to the defense bill and took away from defense spending.


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## barebackjack (Sep 5, 2006)

TK33 said:


> The point is that it is time to rethink some of our global policies and strategies. Is the answer more troops? Is the answer more allied troops? Is the answer something else?


I know what the answer it. But its top secret. :lol:


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## TK33 (Aug 12, 2008)

barebackjack said:


> TK33 said:
> 
> 
> > The point is that it is time to rethink some of our global policies and strategies. Is the answer more troops? Is the answer more allied troops? Is the answer something else?
> ...


No it isn't. The answer is a nuclear bomb.

Or as some of you Bush lovers call it, a nucular bomb. :lol:

Seriously, I still wish that after 9/11 we would have blazed a trail from India to the Mediterranean. Either we do it or we get out of there and let them do it to themselves, either way it will happen.

Don't forget about Isreal. We pull out of there and they will act unilaterally, like they have before. Hello world war 3.


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## barebackjack (Sep 5, 2006)

Actually, I was gonna say, kick the freakin media out of both countries, and LET THE MILITARY DO ITS JOB!!!

Are civilians gonna get caught in a cross-fire every now and than? Yes.

Are mosques used by insurgents as "safe havens" gonna get bombed to oblivion? Yes.

Is it going to be neat and tidy and pretty and give you a warm fuzzy? No.

But such is the nature of war.

As it sits, the military is so damn afraid that CNN is gonna paint something in the wrong light, cut copy paste something to look negative, and generally make the military look to be the evil nar'do-wells, and people will go to Leavenworth over it when the news breaks stateside.

They say we fought Vietnam with one hand tied behind our back. Well, were fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan with BOTH hands tied behind our back.

Kick the media out, and let the Generals and the military do its job.


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## Dak (Feb 28, 2005)

We can win militarily in Afghanistan. Did it once a few years ago. Didn't help much. You all may enjoy reading this.

International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) General Stanley McChrystal Address 1 October 2009
Special Address
General Stanley McChrystal

Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, US Forces Afghanistan

I. Preamble

It is an honour for me to be here and I would like to thank you for giving me the time. I would also like to thank not only my hosts but also all of you who took time to be here today. This is an extraordinarily important subject: we have young people â€" not only from the coalition but also young Afghans â€" in the field today, who depend on the decisions we make and the analysis we do. Taking the time to talk and think about it is always time well-spent, so I thank you for that.

I am privileged to speak here today as the Commander of NATOâ€™s ISAF forces, representing people from 42 troop-contributing nations. I represent them today and I hope to do that well. As you know, I have a British deputy, Lieutenant General Jim Dutton, who is coming to the end of his term and will soon be replaced by another great British officer, Lieutenant General Nick Parker.

Before I continue, I would like to recognise the enormous sacrifice that families here in the UK have made. As you know, the losses that we have suffered are significant in terms of those who have fallen, suffered life-changing injuries, or given up parts of their life just by being away from family. I am in awe of the performance of the British brothers whom I have been honoured to work with for a number of years now.

I am humbled to be here because I do not claim to be in the same category as people who have been talking here, such as Prime Minister Brown and President Zardari, who expressed their views on this complex subject. I do, however, believe that I can offer some perspectives and will try to do that today. I will start by posing seven questions before attempting to answer them. If this works according to my plan, it will totally exhaust your appetite for this issue and I will leave the room to wild cheers and lucrative job offers. If my plan fails, as most of mine do, I will be happy to field any questions that we have time for.

II. What is the Right Approach to Use in Afghanistan?

1. Peopleâ€™s Own Suggestions

People ask me this question all the time; many people offer their own suggestions. There is a multitude of approaches to what to do. Some people say that we should focus primarily on development; others say that we should conduct a counterterrorist-focused battle, given that this
really started after 9/11 and Al-Qaedaâ€™s strikes. Other people say that we should conduct counterinsurgency (COIN). A paper has been written that recommends that we use a plan called â€˜Chaosistanâ€™, and that we let Afghanistan become a Somalia-like haven of chaos that we simply manage from outside.

2. The Complexities of Afghanistan

a. The delicate balance of power
I arrived in Afghanistan in May 2002 and I have spent a part of every year since then involved in the effort. I have learned a tremendous amount about it and, every day, I realise how little about Afghanistan I actually understand. I discount immediately anyone who simplifies the problem or offers a solution, because they have absolutely no idea of the complexity of what we are dealing with.

In Afghanistan, things are rarely as they seem, and the outcomes of actions we take, however well-intended, are often different from what we expect. If you pull the lever, the outcome is not what you have been programmed to think. For example, digging a well sounds quite simple. How could you do anything wrong by digging a well to give people clean water? Where you build that well, who controls that water, and what water it taps into all have tremendous implications and create great passion.
If you build a well in the wrong place in a village, you may have shifted the basis of power in that village. If you tap into underground water, you give power to the owner of that well that they did not have before, because the traditional irrigation system was community-owned. If you dig a well and contract it to one person or group over another, you make a decision that, perhaps in your ignorance, tips the balance of power, or perception thereof, in that village.

Therefore, with a completely altruistic aim of building a well, you can create divisiveness or give the impression that you, from the outside, do not understand what is going on or that you have sided with one element or another, yet all you tried to do is provide water.

b. COIN mathematics

There is another complexity that people do not understand and which the military have to learn: I call it â€˜COIN mathematicsâ€™. Intelligence will normally tell us how many insurgents are operating in an area. Let us say that there are 10 in a certain area. Following a military operation, two are killed. How many insurgents are left? Traditional mathematics would say that eight would be left, but there may only be two, because six of the living eight may have said, â€˜This business of insurgency is becoming dangerous so I am going to do something else.â€™

There are more likely to be as many as 20, because each one you killed has a brother, father, son and friends, who do not necessarily think that they were killed because they were doing something wrong. It does not matter â€" you killed them. Suddenly, then, there may be 20, making the calculus of military operations very different. Yet we are asking young corporals, sergeants and lieutenants to make those kinds of calculations and requiring them to understand the situation. They have to â€" there is no simple workaround.

It is that complex: where you build the well, what military operations to run, who you talk to. Everything that you do is part of a complex system with expected and unexpected, desired and undesired outcomes, and outcomes that you never find out about. In my experience, I have found
that the best answers and approaches may be counterintuitive; i.e. the opposite of what it seems like you ought to do is what ought to be done. When I am asked what approach we should take in Afghanistan, I say â€˜humilityâ€™.

III. What Environment Are We Operating In?

1. Generally Accepted Truths
The answer to this question starts with some generally accepted truths about Afghanistan, which we all know to be true:
a. It is a graveyard of empires.

b. Afghanistan has never been ruled by a strong central government.

c. Afghans do not consider themselves Afghans.

All three are untrue. If you ask an Afghan what he is, he will say, â€˜I am an Afghanâ€™. There have been strong central governments, although different from what you think of as central government. In the sense of governance, there have been periods when Afghanistan absolutely had a central government. Therefore, we have to start by not accepting any of the generally accepted â€˜bumper stickerâ€™ truths.

2. Real Truths

a. Complex, difficult geography and demography

In terms of real truths, it is complex, difficult terrain, both in terms of land and people. It is also a tribal society with a culture that is vastly different from what most of us are familiar with. There are variations around the country; you cannot assume that what is true in one province is true in another. That goes for ethnic, geographic and economic issues. You cannot even assume that what is true in one valley is true in the next any more than you can assume that one neighbourhood in London is exactly the same as another. We would not generalise here, yet sometimes, as outsiders, we want to do that.

b. A long period of conflict

I would also remind people that we have been waging a war for eight years, yet the Afghans have been at it for 30. Life expectancy in Afghanistan is 44 years, so not many people remember pre-conflict life in Afghanistan. Of those 30 years, about 10 were spent fighting the Soviets, followed by six years of â€˜warlordismâ€™ and a further six years of Taliban rule and civil rule, and the last eight years have been eight more years of fighting.

One elder said something that really struck me one night as we were talking: â€˜What you see in Afghanistan now is a reflection of pieces of each of those erasâ€™. It is now a mosaic of the experiences of all those eras. If you think about the impact of 30 years on people and on a society, calculations change. The certainty that you have when you walk through your neighbourhood in London is not the certainty that they have. The expectation of the future is not the expectation that they may have. The opportunities to be educated and to associate with different ethnic groups, which have become more of a challenge in recent years, are very different.

c. A damaged society

The society is what I would call â€˜damagedâ€™. Individuals may not be damaged, but the society is not as it was. It is not so uniformly; nor can you say â€˜it is all different hereâ€™. Tribal structures, relationships and expectations are uncertain now. When you go into a village in a Pashtun area, traditionally you could have predicted what the role and interrelationships of the mullah or the elders would be. That is no longer true. It varies based upon the experience of that area. In some areas, some have disproportionate influence and others have none. Some have been killed. In other cases, elements like the Taliban have come in and completely turned upside down the traditional structures. You can also not assume that traditional structures have disappeared, so you have to go in and learn what the structure is and how people deal with it.

3. A Uniquely Complex Environment

What we face, then, is a uniquely complex environment, where there are at least three regional and resilient insurgencies, with further sub-insurgencies. They have intersected on top of a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 years of war. You then run into someone who raises their finger and says â€˜here is the solutionâ€™ â€" they can have my job.

4. A Crisis of Confidence

We also face a crisis of confidence. Afghans are frustrated after the most recent eight years of war, because in 2001 their expectations skyrocketed. Along with the arrival of coalition forces, they expected a positive change. They saw that initially and then waited for other changes â€" economic development and improvements in governance â€" that, in many cases, may have been unrealistic but, in many cases, were unmet. Therefore, there was a mismatch between what they had hoped for and what they have experienced. Again, as we learn in all societies, expectations and perceptions often matter as much as the reality.

IV. What Is the Situation Now?

1. Serious and Deteriorating
The situation is serious, and I choose that word very carefully. I would add that neither success nor failure for our endeavour in support of the Afghan people and government can be taken for granted. My assessment and my best military judgment is that the situation is, in some ways, deteriorating, but not in all ways.

2. Tremendous Progress
I can also point out areas in which tremendous progress is evident: the construction of roads, provision of clean water, access to healthcare, the presence of children in school, and access to education for females. All of these are up dramatically and hugely positive, and portend well for the future.

3. A Need to Reverse Current Trends
However, a tremendous number of villagers live in fear, and there are officials who either cannot or do not serve their people effectively. Violence is on the increase, not only because there are more
coalition forces, but also because the insurgency has grown. We need to reverse the current trends, and time does matter. Waiting does not prolong a favourable outcome. This effort will not remain winnable indefinitely, and nor will public support. However, the cruel irony is that, in order to succeed, we need patience, discipline, resolve and time.

V. Who is Winning?

1. A Battle of Minds and Perceptions

a. Not a game with points on a scoreboard
The answer to this question depends on who you ask. This is not like a football game with points on a scoreboard; it is more like a political debate, after which both sides announce that they won. That matters because we are not the scorekeepers: not NATO ISAF, not our governments, and not even our press. The perception of all of these entities will matter and they will affect the situation, but ultimately this is going to be decided in the minds and perceptions of the Afghan people of the Afghan government and of the insurgents, whether they can win or are winning, and, most importantly, the perception of the villager who casts his lot with the winner.

b. Villagers make rational and practical decisions
Villagers are supremely rational and practical people: they make the decision on who they will support, based upon who can protect them and provide for them what they need. If a villager lives in a remote area where the government or security forces cannot protect them from coercion or harm from insurgents, he will not support the government â€" it would be illogical. Similarly, if the government cannot provide him with rule of law, the basic ability to adjudicate requirements legally, or just enough services to allow him to pursue a likelihood, it is difficult for him to make a rational decision to support the government. The Taliban is not popular. It does not have a compelling context. What it has is proximity to the people and the ability to provide coercion and, in some cases, things like basic rule of law, based upon the fact that they are there and can put themselves in that position. The perception of the villager matters in terms of which side he should support, so winning the battle of perception is key.

c. Allowing the facts to speak for themselves
I also think that winning the battle of perception, as it applies everywhere but particularly to us, is about credibility. As I told you, the situation is absolutely not deteriorating by every indicator, but I will not stand up and say that we are winning until I am told by indicators that we are winning. For me to stand up and claim good things that are not supported by data in order to motivate us and make us feel good very rapidly undermines our credibility. Our own forces are smart enough to do that, so I intend to tell people the best assessment that we can, as accurately as possible, and allow the facts to speak for themselves.

VI. It Has Been Eight Years â€" Why Is It Not Better?
This is a fair question for the Afghan people and for societies that have supported this effort. It is true that, after eight years of tremendous effort and expenditure and the loss of good people, many things are worse. Why have eight years of effort not made things better? There are a number of complex reasons:

1. The insurgency grew.

2. Expectations both expected and unexpected â€" were not met, which has created frustration.

3. It took us longer than I wish it had to recognise this as a serious insurgency. As the Taliban started to regain its effectiveness, we lagged in terms of accepting that as a clear reality.
Through our actions, we â€" i.e. the coalition and its Afghan partners â€" sometimes exacerbate the problems.

4. We have under-resourced our operations.

5. In some areas, we have underperformed; in others, we have under-coordinated.

6. We have struggled with unity of effort, national agreements and chains of command that are complex to say the least.

7. In some ways, we have not overcome some of our intrinsic disadvantages. We are operating in a very different culture, with language differences, relationships that do not exist and a complex situation that takes time to understand, yet we have not effectively developed enough expertise, continuity of people or sufficient numbers of language-trained people to deal with the situation as effectively as we could have.

8. Most importantly, our own operational culture â€" and by â€˜ourâ€™ I mean coalition forces â€" and manner of operating distances us physically and psychologically from the people who we seek to protect. We need to connect with people, yet physical or linguistic barriers make it increasingly difficult. Ultimately, our security comes from the people. We cannot build enough walls to protect ourselves if the people do not.
We must, then, operate and think in a fundamentally new way.

VII. Can We Succeed?

1. Protecting the Afghan People from the Enemy

We can succeed. We must redefine the fight. The objective is the will of the Afghan people. We must protect the Afghan people from all threats: from the enemy and from our own actions. Let me describe it: a few days ago, just before we left to travel here, a bus south of Kandahar struck an improvised explosive device (IED) killing 30 Afghan civilians. That is tragic.

On the one hand, you might say that the Afghan people would recoil against the Taliban who left that IED. To a degree, they do, but we must also understand that they recoil against us because they might think that, if we were not there, neither would be the IED. Therefore, we indirectly caused the IED to be there. Second, we said that we would protect them, but we did not. Sometimes, then, the most horrific events caused by the insurgents continue to reinforce in the minds of the Afghan people a mindset that coalition forces are either ineffective, or at least that their presence in Afghanistan is not in their interest. That does not happen all of the time. There are times when they feel differently, but you have to put things in that context to understand what we must do.

2. Protection from Our Own Actions

a. Respecting the people
We also need to protect them from our own actions. When we fight, if we become focused on destroying the enemy but end up killing Afghan civilians, destroying Afghan property or acting in a way that is perceived as arrogant, we convince the Afghan people that we do not care about them. If we say, â€˜We are here for you â€" we respect and want to protect youâ€™, while destroying their home, killing their relatives or destroying their crops, it is difficult for them to connect those two concepts. It would be difficult for us to do the same. The understanding, then, must be that we respect the people.

b. Changing our mindset
We must assign responsibility because, ultimately, the Afghans must defeat the insurgency. As a force, however, we must change our mindset. Whether or not we like it, we have a conventional warfare culture â€" not just our militaries but our societies. Our societies want to see lines on a map moving forward towards objectives, but you will not see that in a counterinsurgency because you do not see as clearly what is happening in peopleâ€™s minds. We will have to do things dramatically and even uncomfortably differently in order to change how we think and operate.
In short, we cannot succeed by simply trying harder. We cannot drop three more bombs and have a greater effect; it is much more subtle than that.

3. Crucial Next Steps

In my mind, therefore, what we must do over the next period of time is:

a. Gain the initiative by reversing the perceived momentum possessed by the insurgents.

b. Seek rapid growth of Afghan national security forces â€" the army and the police.

c. Improve their effectiveness and ours through closer partnering, which involves planning, living and operating together and taking advantage of each otherâ€™s strengths as we go forward. Within ISAF, we will put more emphasis on every part of that, by integrating our headquarters, physically co-locating our units, and sharing ownership of the problem.

d. Address shortfalls in the capacity of governance and the ability of the Afghan government to provide rule of law.

e. Tackle the issue of predatory corruption by some officials or by warlords who are not in an official position but who seem to have the ability, sometimes sanctioned by existing conditions, to do that.

f. Focus our resources and prioritise in those areas where the population is most threatened. We do not have enough forces to do everything everywhere at once, so this has to be prioritised and phased over time.

4. A Need for Resolve
As you know, the concepts that I have outlined here are not new, but if we implement them aggressively and effectively, we can create a revolution in terms of our effectiveness. We must show resolve. Uncertainty disheartens our allies, emboldens our foe. A villager recently asked me whether we intended to remain in his village and provide security, to which I confidently promised him that, of course, we would. He looked at me and said, â€˜Okay, but you did not stay last time.â€™

VIII. Why Bother?

1. The Risk Posed by Al-Qaeda
Afghanistan is difficult, so why bother? It is a long way away. It is not our business. As we know, however, 9/11 brought us here to the latest interaction, and transnational terrorist threats absolutely remain. I believe that the loss of stability in Afghanistan brings a huge risk that transnational terrorists such as Al-Qaeda will operate from within Afghanistan again.

2. High Stakes for Afghanistan and the Region
I also believe that the stakes are high for Afghanistan and for the region. An unstable Afghanistan not only negatively affects what happens within its borders but also affects its neighbours. Afghanistan is, in many ways, one of the keys to stability in south Asia. A state that can provide its own security is important to all international security, and certainly to that of the UK, the US and our international partnership. The Afghan people are worth bothering about and they deserve that.

IX. Conclusion
In conclusion, I am exceptionally proud to serve at ISAF. Within my office, I have a picture of a British battle group, led by Lieutenant Colonel Gus Fair, with whom I worked for a long time in Iraq. He is with his soldiers, who I had the opportunity to speak with when I visited them during operations in Spin Majid this summer in the Helmand River valley. I keep that picture because, when I looked into their eyes, which were bloodshot with fatigue, I remember the extraordinary professionalism, competence and sheer courage of those young men. Whenever I come to London, I like to run through the city, and I particularly like the statues that you have erected to heroes. I hope that you erect one to that generation â€" they have earned it. Thank you.


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## Old Hunter (Mar 8, 2002)

Muslims slaughtered 93 of their own women and children today.They are getting more powerful, Pakistan could fall.


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## TK33 (Aug 12, 2008)

Thanks for the read Dak, that was great. :beer:

I agree with BBJ, get the media the heck out of there. I am just fine seeing the details of this war in 10 years on the discovery channel. I was watching nightline on Monday and they brought up the Geneva Convention. What does the Geneva Convention have to do with fighting an insurgency? I know the pundits will say if we don't follow the rules, we subject ourselves to the same thing. The insurgents don't follow the rules why should we? We need to fight to win, by any means necessary.


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## Hunter_58346 (May 22, 2003)

TK>>>>You have never served, there fore you will never know,,,,,


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## Dak (Feb 28, 2005)

I can't imagine being in a military that doesn't do everything it can to adhere to the Geneva Conventions. Once the moral high ground is abandoned...it's hard to regain.


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## southdakbearfan (Oct 11, 2004)

We haven't won a war, in it's true sense, since the modern media was allowed to be involved.


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## Dak (Feb 28, 2005)

Nor have we fought a war that the entire country was committed to.


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## TK33 (Aug 12, 2008)

Dak said:


> I can't imagine being in a military that doesn't do everything it can to adhere to the Geneva Conventions. Once the moral high ground is abandoned...it's hard to regain.


That is the tough part, I see exactly what you are saying. How much have the rules changed?? I am not sure how the Geneva Convention applies here because this war doesn't apply to a nation or an organized government. There have been no rules set for guerrilla wars. This is one of the many re-thinking processes that needs to be examined. If you look at the history of muslim fighting, they play by no rules and fratracide and collateral damage mean nothing to them.

I talked to a buddy of mine two nights ago that is in Afghanistan, on the Pakistani Border. He talks alot about how they are kind of fighting with one hand tied behind their back and how the media does them no favors back home. As bearfan eluded to.


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## farmerj (Jun 19, 2004)

Interesting "side Story"



> U.S. official resigns over Afghan war
> Foreign Service officer and former Marine captain says he no longer knows why his nation is fighting


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## seabass (Sep 26, 2002)

Here's another take on the role of US in Afghanistani affairs:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/opinion/28friedman.html?_r=1&em


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## Plainsman (Jul 30, 2003)

Well, we need to crap or get off the pot. One way or the other, but don't screw around and let our boys get shot to pieces.

The big problem is Obama. The whole world knows he is a wimp and a Islamic sympathiser. His answer is to put more news people on the scene and prosecute anyone who scolds a combatant that isn't actively shooting at him. He has no respect for the military or our laws and law enforcement people.

Obama dreams of an Islamic/Socialist society in America.


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## Bowstring (Nov 27, 2006)

I agree Plainsman!!


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## swampbuck (Sep 19, 2007)

we won we should comw home period! read this short article.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/kwiatkowski/ ... ki238.html


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## Plainsman (Jul 30, 2003)

She started off with some good points, then went off the deep end, then returned to sanity (sort of).

She made some points about the Taliban not getting support from al Qaeda, but they are getting it from somewhere. The other point is success means different things to different people and perhaps we have had some measure of success.
The part about our generals running Washington doesn't make a point, it simply showcases her extreme bias and dislike of the military.
Her last point about Obama doing something retroactive to earn his Nobel Peace Prize was humorous. It was also like a mental parachute bringing her back to slight reality after her clear anti-military rant.

I have some advise for her. When you have a point to make do it, and don't mix it with unsubstantiated clear bias. Often people will hear neither, get hung up on the negative, or simply write you off as another partisan waste of good oxygen.

As far as Obama holding off: It may be a case of the wrong decision being less destructive than no decision. Reinforce or bring them home, but don't leave them alone to be chewed up every day while he twiddles his thumbs. Rome is burning stop fiddling.


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## farmerj (Jun 19, 2004)

Seems people aren't reading some of the side articles.



page 1 said:


> While the Taliban is a malign presence, and Pakistan-based al-Qaeda needs to be confronted, he said, the United States is asking its troops to die in Afghanistan for what is essentially a far-off civil war.





page 3 said:


> Korengal and other areas, he said, taught him "how localized the insurgency was. I didn't realize that a group in this valley here has no connection with an insurgent group two kilometers away." Hundreds, maybe thousands, of groups across Afghanistan, he decided, had few ideological ties to the Taliban but took its money to fight the foreign intruders and maintain their own local power bases.
> 
> "That's really what kind of shook me," he said. "I thought it was more nationalistic. But it's localism. I would call it valley-ism."


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